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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION 
OF GREATER NEW YORK, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20945 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN, ROSEN, DIPRETA AND 
GOLDSTEIN, L.L.P. (MANLIO DIPRETA of counsel), for Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(JOYCE RACHEL ELLMAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Local 100, Transport Workers 
Union of Greater New York, AFL-CIO (TWU), to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) granting respondent's, New York City Transit Authority (Authority) motion 
to dismiss TWU's improper practice charge alleging that the Authority violated 
§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it served 
a disciplinary notice upon a unit member, John Wagner, at his residence in violation of 
established past practice. Previously, as alleged in the charge, the Authority served its 
disciplinary notices upon a unit member on Authority premises. 
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The parties stipulated to the following facts: 
(a) that the charge alleges that the Authority violated the past practice that 
employees and union representatives were served simultaneously with 
disciplinary action notices (DANs) at the general superintendent's office, 
and that in this instance, the past practice was unilaterally changed when 
John Wagner was served personally at his residence. The TWU was 
aware on February 11,1999 that he was served that day at his residence, 
and the charge in this matter was filed on June 23, 1999. 
(b) the allegation in the charge alleging a violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) is withdrawn.1 
: It is upon the stipulated facts that the ALJ found that, on February 11, 1999, 
Wagner and the TWU had actualknowledge of the Authority's intention to immediately 
suspend Wagner and seek termination of his employment. 
The Authority moved to dismiss the charge on the basis of timeliness and waiver. 
TWU excepts to the ALJ's determination that its charge was untimely. TWU argues that 
it was lulled into inaction because the Authority failed to notify it that the Authority 
intended to ignore the five-day appeal procedure in the CBA's grievance provision. 
Consequently, as a result of the Authority's unilateral change in practice, the charge 
was timely when measured from February 25, 1999 (the date of Wagner's employment 
• fo rminaf in r^ r a t h o r t h a n F o h n i a r v "l 1 1 QQQ l\Y\a Hp+o rvf W a n n o r ' c o m n l n \ / m o n t 
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suspension). 
1See Exhibit B, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
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Based upon, our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
In County of Nassau (Police Department),2 we held that a motion to dismiss 
made to an ALJ "should not be granted without careful deliberation." Therefore, the 
ALJ "must assume the truth of all of the charging party's evidence and give the : 
charging party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those 
assumed facts".3 : 
The Authority raised the defenses of timeliness and waiver. Section 204.1(a)(4) 
of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) mandates that an improper practice charge be 
filed within four monthsof the date of the conduct which is the subject of the charge. 
The TWU relies upon our decision in Middle Country Teachers Association 
(Werner) (hereafter Middle Country),4 for support of its exceptions. The TWU, however, 
has misinterpreted our decision in Middle Country. TWU argues that the date of actual 
injury (February 25, 1999) is the operative date which commences the running of the 
four-month limitation period found in our rule §204:1 (a)(1). 
We have determined that "[i]n the context of a unilateral change allegation, the: 
legal injury is to the union only and injury/implementation occurs when the change is 
made. Nothing in Middle Country suggests that notification cannot coincide with 
217 PERB 1J3013, at 3030 (1984). 
3ld. 
421 PERB 1J3012 (1988). 
) 
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injury/implementation . . . ."5 Here, the parties' stipulation acknowledges that the TWU, 
on February 11, 1999, was served simultaneously with the DAN that John Wagner 
received at his home instead of the workplace. It is this change in the place of service 
of the DAN that formed the basis of TWU's §209-a.1(d) charge, as stipulated. 
Consequently, on February .11,1999, the TWU was on notice of the alleged unilateral 
change in the Authority's practice but, nevertheless, sat on its rights until June 23, 
1999.6 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny TWU's exceptions and we affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 1, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
'Marc A- AbbottVMember 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
5City of Oswego, 23 PERB 1J3007, at 3018 (1990); see also Public Employees 
Fed'n (Levy), 31 PERB ^3090 (1998). 
6Upon this record, we find no evidence of interference to support a violation of 
§209-a.1(a). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
— Charging Early, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18291 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public Employees Federation, 
AFL-CIO (PEF), to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
improper practice charge alleging, inter alia, that the State of New York (Office of the 
State Inspector General) (State) had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the Governor issued Executive Order No. 39 (hereinafter 
referred to as EO-39) requiring employees of all State executive branch agencies to 
report to the State inspector Generai any information regarding misconduct by way of 
corruption, fraud, criminal activity, etc. The failure to report such activity forms the basis 
for disciplinary action. 
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PEF also alleged in its charge that prior to EO-39, there was no such reporting 
requirement. Thus, EO-39 imposed a new work rule which changed the terms and 
conditions of employment of its unit members. 
The State, in its Answer, alleged that there has been no change in work rules 
because the reporting requirement has either been an explicit or implicit rule that has \ 
been followed within the agencies. The State does not deny that it did not negotiate the 
implementation of EO-39 with PEF. v 
A hearing was held on May 19, 1999, during which the State moved to dismiss 
PEF's charge at the close of PEF's direct case. The ALJ reserved decision on the 
motion and the State proceeded to put on its direct case. Upon review of the evidence 
produced by PEF, the ALJ granted the State's motion and dismissed PEF's charge. 
PEF excepts to the ALJ's determination and contends that: 
(a) EO-39 was'a new reporting requirement with a disciplinary component 
and, therefore, its promulgation by the State changed terms and 
conditions of employment for PEF-represented employees. 
(b) The ALJ's conclusion that since the prior executive orders contained no 
reporting requirement, PEF had to prove the existence of a negative, i.e., 
prove np prior practice of reporting existed in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss, is in error. 
(c) The ALJ granted the motion without considering any of the record 
developed during the State's case. 
Board--U-18291 -3 
FACTS 
On June 17, 1996, Governor George Pataki issued EO-39, which revoked prior 
Executive Order 103 and broadened the scope of the Office of the State Inspector 
General. As part of EO-39, "[E]very state officer or employee in a covered agency shall 
report promptly to the State Inspector General any information concerning corruption, 
• fraud , . . etc." EO-39 also contained a disciplinary provision for the knowing failure to 
comply. 
On October 16, 1996, PEF filed an improper practice charge alleging the 
issuance of EO-39 without prior negotiation violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. The State's 
Answer contends that there has been no change in the work rule that required 
~N, employees to report instances of wrongdoing to their employer. 
A hearing took place on May 19, 1999. At the hearing, counsel for PEF and the 
State introduced into the record as joint exhibits EO-39 and three prior executive orders 
.,.. all entitled "Establishing the Office of the State Inspector General", as well as, the last 
collective bargaining agreement between PEF and the State.1 Counsel for PEF rested: 
upon "the introduction and admission of Joint Exhibits 1 and 2."2 Counsel for the State 
moved to dismiss the charge and the ALJ reserved decision on the motion. The State 
called its first and only witness, at which point, PEF objected on the grounds of 
relevancy.3 The ALJ overruled PEF's objection and the State's witness testified. 
1Transcript pp. 3-4. 
2Transcript p." 5 [Joint 1 (EO-39); Joint Exhibit 2 (EO-103 dated October 14, 
. J 1987)]. 
3Transcript p. 6. 
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During cross-examination of the State's witness, certain documents were 
identified and, by stipulation, these documents were received as rebuttal evidence in 
PEF's case.4 The State rested and PEF called no rebuttal witnesses.5 It is upon this 
record that the ALJ decided to dismiss PEF's improper practice charge. 
•: . . . , DISCUSSION /__ 
Historically, we departed from the NLRB enforcement model and left the 
responsibility for presenting an improper practice case to the charging party.6 As a 
result, we have developed our own precedents to guide our decisions. 
In this context, we have established precedents regarding the charging party's 
burden of proof:7 Our interpretation of the Taylor Law and our Rules of Procedure have 
\ been given great deference by the courts.8 It has been determined that we are the court 
of original jurisdiction in an [improper] practice charge.9 We have held that a charge will 
4Transcript p. 32 [identified in the record as charging party Exhibit 1]. 
5Transcript p. 33. 
6Donovan, Ronald, Administering the Taylor Law: Public Employee Relations in 
New York, ILR Press (1990), p. 179. 
?County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB fl3013 (1984). 
8New York City Transit Auth. v. PERB, 147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dep't 
1989), amended, 156 AD2d 689, 23 PERB 1J7002 (2d Dep't 1989), appeal dismissed, 
78 NY2d 1122, 24 PERB <|7018 (1991). (Court approved of PERB's use of the CPLR 
definition of affirmative defense because of the adversarial nature of improper practice 
proceedings). 
9SeeOdessa-MontourCent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 228 AD2d 892, 29 PERB 1J7009 
(3d Dep't 1996); Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 214 AD2d 288, 28 PERB fl7013 (3d 
Dep't 1995), motion for leave to appeal denied, 88 NY2d 866, 29 PERB H7007 (1996). 
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be dismissed if a charging party has not sustained its burden of proof.10 No further-
hearings need be held where the evidence presented by the charging party does not set 
forth a prima facie case.1112 It is well established in a §209-a.1(d) charge that [the 
charging party] has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the reliable 
evidence that a change in the past practice had, in fact, occurred13 Consequently, if the 
charging party fails to prove an essential element of the charge, the case will be 
dismissed.14 Furthermore, the charging party cannot rely upon cross-examination of the 
respondent's witnesses to establish a prima facie case.15 
We have previously established a standard of proof within which to judge the 
merits of a motion to dismiss. We have held that with respect to "a motion made to [an 
ALJ] to dismiss a charge after the presentation of charging party's evidence . . . [w]e 
would reverse [an ALJ's] decision to grant such a motion unless we could conclude that 
10Whitesboro Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB ff3039 (1981). 
u
 County of Nassau (Police Dep't), supra note 7. 
^Suffolk County BOCES III, 25 PERB P020, at 3041 (1992), "[W]e do not 
investigate a party's allegations, even those over which we have jurisdiction. It is the 
charging party's obligation to plead and prove a case and to do whatever investigation 
is considered necessary." 
^County of Nasau, 31 PERB 1J4612 (1998); County of Nassau, 28 PERB 1J4662 
( i»aO), nainview-yjiQ neinpagt} t_»6/7t. oufl. umi., z / rc:rM_> ] j4oo-: ( i » » 4 ) . 
14See Professional Staff Congress and City Univ. of New York, 23 PERB 1J3030 
(1990); SUNY (Buffalo), 23 PERB fl4582 (1990). 
^
5Nanuet Union Free Sch. Dist. and Nanuet Teachers Ass'n, 17 PERB fl3005 
(1984). 
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the evidence produced by the charging party, including all reasonable inferences 
therefrom, is plainly insufficient even in the absence of any rebuttal ...."16 
Turning to the merits, in affirming the ALJ's determination to dismiss PEF's 
charge, the question is whether PEF in its direct case has demonstrated a change in 
work rules. :_ • .-
PEF alleged in its charge that prior to the Governor issuing EO-39, there was no 
legal, statutory or administrative requirement that PS&T unit employees comply with the 
reporting requirement contained in EO-39,17 that the reporting requirement allegedly 
imposed a new work rule,18 and thatthis new work rule constituted a change in the terms 
and conditions of employment for all PS&T unit employees.19 Lastly, PEF alleged that 
the State, through GOER; did not negotiate this new work rule prior to its 
implementation.20 
PEF had the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a : 
change in work rules had occurred, but the record in PEF's case is devoid of any 
evidence that demonstrated the working conditions that existed prior to the 
implementation of EO-39. PEF chose to limit its proof to the two executive orders. If we 
were to assume that these two documents represented the best evidence of the 
16
'County of Nassau (Police Dep't), supra note 7, at 3029-30. 
17Tfi6 improper Practice charge. 
18fl7 Improper Practice charge. 
191|8 Improper Practice charge. 
20U9 Improper Practice charge. 
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circumstances surrounding the reporting requirement, PEF has missed the point. It is 
PEF that has alleged the change and must demonstrate the conditions that existed prior 
to the implementation of EO-39. This is a question of fact which exists independently of 
the executive orders.21 
We have endorsed the application of the parol evidence rule in our proceedings in 
appropriate circumstances to explain the contents of a writing.22 PEF failed to call any 
witness who would have knowledge of the working conditions of PEF unit members, i.e., 
any reporting requirement, prior to the issuance of EO-39. Furthermore, such a witness 
may have been able to explain whether EO-39 represented a change in conditions of 
employment from those that existed under EO-103. There is, therefore, no evidence in 
the record up to the point at which the motion to dismiss was made to vary the terms of 
EO-103 or to explain a practice which may have developed with respect to the reporting 
requirements. These essential facts were still in dispute at the close of PEF's direct 
case. 
PEF also excepts on the ground that the ALJ granted the State's motion without 
considering any of the record developed during the State's case. In support of this 
argument, PEF relies on our decision in Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre 
(hereafter Rockville Centre).23 PEF's reliance on Rockville Centre is misplaced. The 
^Richardson on Evidence, §572, at p. 581 (Jerome Prince, ed.,10th ed. 1973). 
22Village of Port Chester, 18 PERB^3058 (1985). See also Town of Callicoon, 
70 NY2d 907, 21 PERB fl7501 (1987) (arbitrator's reliance on "past practice" clause 
and parol evidence was not completely irrational). 
'28 PERB U3056(1995). 
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ALJ in Rockville Centre adjourned the hearing sine die after the respondent moved to 
dismiss at the close of the charging party's direct case. Obviously, the only record 
available to the Board in reaching its decision to reverse the determination of the ALJ 
was the charging party's direct case. 
Indeed. Rockville Centre stands for exactly the same proposition that we hold 
here: when deciding a motion to dismiss at the close of the charging party's case, the 
motion succeeds or fails on the evidence of the charging party's direct case alone. 
Rockville Centre differs from this case only in that the charging party met its burden of 
proving a prima facie case on its direct case. Here it did not. It is for these reasons that 
Rockville Centre is factually and legally distinguishable. 
We are constrained by our precedents to consider only the charging party's direct 
case when a motion to dismiss has been made.24 Furthermore, PEF cannot rely upon 
the cross-examination of the State's witness to establish its prima facie case. Here, PEF 
has pled certain affirmative facts which it failed to prove in its direct case through the use 
of independent evidence.25 Consequently, PEF is not entitled to a new hearing merely 
because it was mistaken as to the elements it was required to prove.26 
Based upon the foregoing, we hereby deny PEF's exceptions in their entirety and 
affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
2ACounty of Nassau, (Police Dep't), supra note 7. 
25City of Yonkers, 10 PERB fl3020 (1977). 
2eld. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: May 1, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
o STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION OF ERIE 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, LOCAL 3300, UAW, 
REGION 9, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. CP-549 
COUNTY OF ERIE AND ERIE COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CHIACCHIA & FLEMING (ANDREW P. FLEMING of counsel), for Petitioner 
BRIAN D. DOYLE, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Administrators Association of 
Erie Community College, Local 3300, UAW, Region 9 (Association) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its unit placement petition which sought to 
place the title of Academic Dean in its unit. The ALJ determined that the Academic 
Deans were sufficiently engaged in policy-making on behalf of their joint employer, the 
County of Erie (County) and Erie Community College (College), to preclude their 
( j i d o e i i i 6 i i i in L I IC /-\SSuoi<auuii a UI I IL . 
The ALJ determined that the Academic Deans formulate policy on a College-
\ 
wide basis in their respective areas and that they are managerial because they play a 
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key role in curriculum development, effectively determining the educational complexion 
of the College. 
The Association argues in its exceptions to the ALJ's decision that the ALJ erred 
factually and legally in her analysis of the case because there are presently included in 
its bargaining unit titles that are as managerial if not more so than the Academic Deans. 
The County/College has not responded to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the Association's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
In 1985, the College and the Association entered into an agreement by which the 
title of Campus Academic Dean was deemed by the parties to be r 
managerial/confidential and that any employees appointed to fill the position upon the 
vacancy of the position would thereafter be excluded from the bargaining unit. At that 
time, the three Campus Academic Deans had responsibilities with respect to each one 
of the three College campuses to which they were assigned.1 The Deans reported 
directly to the Vice-President of Academic Affairs and indirectly to the College 
President. They had general curriculum responsibilities in all program areas for their 
campus, budget responsibilities, and they supervised and evaluated certain 
administrators. 
1The College consists of three campuses; North Campus, South Campus and 
City Campus. 
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In 1994, the College's reorganization became effective. The Campus Academic 
Deans became Academic Deans with College-wide program responsibilities: Academic 
Dean of Allied Health and Technologies, Academic Dean of Liberal Arts and Academic 
Dean of Business and Public Service. Their duties included the supervision and 
direction of their program curriculum, evaluation of the curriculum, attendance at 
advisory board meetings, faculty evaluation and budgetary responsibilities. : 
DISCUSSION 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Academic Deans share a 
community of interest with other titles in its bargaining unit, such as the Executive Dean 
of Development and Community Services, Dean of Students, Director of Athletics, 
Director of Budget, Registrar, Dean of Student Development and Dean of Retention 
Services, among others, that warrants their placement in the unit. The Association 
concedes in its exceptions that the Academic Deans are responsible for policy 
formulation, but argues that because so many of the titles it represents formulate 
college-wide policy, the Academic Deans share a community of interest with titles in the 
bargaining unit which warrants their placement in the Association's unit. 
In County of Rockland,2 we reiterated the standards to be utilized in a petition 
seeking to represent unrepresented employees when the employer argues that certain 
employees be excluded from the proposed unit because of their managerial or 
confidential duties. We there noted (at 3141-42): 
228PERBP063(1995). 
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In determining whether a public employee should be deprived of 
representation rights, in either the context of a managerial/confidential 
application or a representation petition, we are controlled by the criteria 
set forth in the Act (footnote omitted), as interpreted and applied in our 
decisions: 
The first criterion for managerial designation is "Policy 
formulation." An employee who either individually selects 
from among options those which are to be the objectives of 
a public employer in fulfilling its mission, and the methods 
and extent of meeting those objectives, or who regularly 
participates in the essential process resulting in such 
decisions, formulates policy within the meaning of the Act. A 
person who participates in that process in a clerical or 
advisory role or as a resource person does not satisfy that 
criterion. 
Clearly, the Academic Deans here meet the criteria for managerial employees 
who formulate policy.3 The Association concedes the managerial status of the 
Academic Deans, but argues that because of a community of interest with other 
employees in the unit that the Academic Deans should be placed in its bargaining unit. 
In deciding a unit placement petition, community of interest is but one factor to be 
considered. We also look to job descriptions, civil service job specifications, the duties 
actually performed, and the public employer's placement, or nonplacement, of the title 
in a unit of represented employees.4 That the Association may represent other 
employees who may be managerial employees within the meaning of the Act does not 
compel, or even support, the placement of these clearly managerial employees in its 
bargaining unit. 
3Clinton Community Coll., 31 PERB P070 (1998). See also County of 
Rensselaer (Hudson Valley Community. Coll.), 17 PERB fl4060 (1984), aff'd, 18 PERB 
113001 (1985). 
4County of Rockland, supra note 2. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: May 1, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Mgfrc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
n STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
C:bargLng Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20707 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
GOODSTEIN & WEST (ROBERT DAVID GOODSTEIN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
) ALAN D. SCHESNKMAN, COUNTY ATTORNEY (LORI A. ALESIO of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) who found a violation of §209-a. 1(d) of the Public Employees'Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by the County of Westchester when it changed its prior practice 
and began withholding income tax on a bi-weekly basis from individual correction 
officers whose Workers' Compensation and General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c 
claims were controverted. The County denied any violation of the Act and alleged, by 
way of an affirmative defense, that tax withholding under the circumstances of 
controverted disability claims is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
J . • 
In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted a stipulated record and filed briefs. 
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FACTS 
The Stipulation of Facts is as follows: 
1. Pursuant to a letter opinion of the Internal Revenue Service, 
from approximately January 1, 1992 through February 1999, the 
COUNTY did not withhold income tax from the bi-weekly wages 
and salaries of correction officers presently on correction officer 
compensation (Workers' Compensation and General Municipal 
Law §207-c) even if an officer's enfitlemehtto^said 
compensation was controverted. 
2. Unilaterally, and without negotiations with the union, on or about 
February 11, 1999 the COUNTY determined that it would begin 
withholding income tax on a bi-weekly basis from individual 
correction officers when it "controverted" their claims. 
3. Pursuant to the;annexed IRS letter ruling, the COUNTY 
employer has the discretion to either withhold income tax bi-
weekly and reimburse correction officers at the end of the 
calendar year, or to issue bi-weekly pay checks without 
withholding. 
4. Although the COUNTY began on or about February 11, 1999 
withholding income tax from other correction officers whose 
claims were not controverted, it acknowledged that this was in 
error. 
5. However, although it prospectively corrected said error, the 
other correction officers whose monies were withheld have not 
been retroactively reimbursed as of this date. 
6. Further, in March 1999, the COUNTY proceeded to withhold 
income tax from other individual members of COBA's 
bargaining unit on correction officer compensation, without 
negotiation with the union, claiming the cases were 
controverted. Again, although some of these withholdings were 
credited to "error" by the COUNTY, to date, the remaining 
correction officers have not been reimbursed for monies 
withheld without negotiations. 
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DISCUSSION 
The Stipulation of Facts paraphrases the contents of the improper practice 
charge filed by the Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Association, 
Inc. (COBA). 
COBA is alleging a unilateral change in a past practice. Under the Act, a past
 ; 
practice must concern a mandatory subject of bargaining.1 It is axiomatic under the Act 
that public employees through their employee organizations bargain with their public 
employers over the terms and conditions of employment.2 Salaries and wages are by 
definition terms and conditions of employment3 and, therefore, a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.4 
The parties'stipulation demonstrates that the County, relying upon an opinion 
letter from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), did not withhold income tax from the 
wages and salaries of correction officers receiving disability compensation (Worker's 
Compensation and/or GML §207-c) even if the claim was controverted.5 This practice 
1
 Farmingdale Union Free Sen. Dist, (hereafter Farmingdale), 7 PERB P056 
(1974). 
2Act, §203. 
3Act, §201.4. 
4
 Plainedge Fed'n of Teachers, 31 PERB |f3015 (1998); Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Ass'n of Newburgh, New York, Inc., 30 PERB p 0 0 7 (1997); Unatego Nonteaching 
Ass'n v. PERB, 134 AD2d 62, 21 PERB 1J7002 (3d Dep't 1987), motion for leave to 
appeal denied, 71 NY2d 805, 21 PERB H7010 (1988). 
51|1 of Stipulation of Facts (since neither party relies upon a collective bargaining 
agreement or any other collectively negotiated procedure as a source of right for this 
conduct, we shall for the purposes of this decision consider this to be a practice). 
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went on for several years, commencing on or about January 1, 1992 through February 
1996.6 
We have established the criteria a charging party must prove to establish a prima 
facie case that a violation of a past practice has occurred. In Farmingdale, we held that 
to prove an improper unilateral change in a term and condition of employment which is 
not defined by written agreement between the parties, it is the burden of "the charging 
party to establish that there was an established past policy [or practice] which was 
changed . . . ."7 It is well settled that in order to demonstrate the existence of a past 
practipe, a charging party must prove that the practice "was unequivocal and was 
continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances [footnote 
omitted] to create a reasonable expectation among the affected employees that the 
[practice] would continue."8 If such a practice is found to exist, the employer is not 
privileged to change such practice without first negotiating with the union.9 
TheCounty in its exceptions and brief argues that the IRS opinion letter gives it 
the discretion to withhold certain taxes from the salary or wages of disabled correction 
officers and, therefore, the act of withholding taxes is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. We disagree. 
6See note 5 supra. 
7Farmingdale, supra note 1, at 3092. 
8County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029, at 3058 (1991). 
9County of Nassau, 13 PERB H3095 (1980), cont'd, 14 PERB 1T7017 (Sup. Ct. 
Nassau County 1981), aff'd, 87 AD2d 1006, 15 PERB 1J7012 (2d Dep't 1982), motion 
for leave to appeal denied, 57 NY2d 601, 15 PERB 1J7015 (1983). 
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While we have not previously decided this issue, we have held that unilaterally 
implementing a procedure under which an employer deducted pay of unit members 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act.10 We have held that "[w]ages are a term and condition 
of employment that cannot be changed without negotiations . . . . [Deductions in salary, 
lump sum pay, the method of calculating pay, the date on which employees are to be 
paid, and retroactivity are mandatorily negotiable."11 
The County also argues in its exceptions that the manner of payment to disabled 
correction officers is governed by the GML, and in addition, that its unilateral action of 
withholding taxes is not a term or condition of employment that is subject to negotiation. 
For the reasons previously discussed, these exceptions lack merit. The authorities 
^ cited in the County's exceptions and brief are factually and legally distinguishable. In 
j 
Leirer v. Caputo?2 the Court of Appeals held that the County Treasurer improperly 
recouped certain overpayments made to an employee after conducting an audit. It was 
held in City of Albany™ that recoupment is mandatorily negotiable. The issue in 
Webster Central School District v. PERBU dealt with whether the school district's 
decision to contract with BOCES for services was mandatorily negotiable. The Court 
™ City of Albany, 23 PERB 1(4531, exceptions dismissed, 23 PERB 1J3027 (1990). 
11/tf. at 4571. See County of Orange, 12 PERB 1J3114 (1979), cont'd, 76 AD2d 
878, 13 PERB 1J7009 (2d Dep't 1980) motion for leave to appeal denied, 51 NY2d 703, 
13 PERB 1J7013 (1980); County of Monroe, 10 PERB 1J3104 (1977); Lynbrook PBA, 10 
PERB 1f3067 (1977). See also City of Newburgh, 20 PERB 1J3017 (1987). 
1281NY2d 455 (1993). 
J ™Supra note 10. 
75 NY2d 619, 23 PERB 1J7013 (1990). 
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decision to contract with BOCES for services was mandatorily negotiable. The Court 
answered this in the negative because it was a matter of statutory construction resolved 
by a 1984 amendment to the BOCES statute clearly evidencing the Legislature's intent. 
The issue in Schenectady Police Benevolent Association v. PERB^5 dealt with statutory 
construction of GML §207-c. The Court of Appeals held that a direction to a disabled 
officer to perform light duty or undergo medical treatment was not mandatorily 
negotiable. There is no corresponding express language in GML §207-c giving the 
employer the discretion or requiring an employer to withhold taxes from a disabled 
officer's wages. In City School District of the City of New Rochelle,™ the school district 
reduced services by cutting the budget. This was obviously a management 
prerogative. 
In the instant improper practice charge, the County stipulated that it did not 
withhold income tax from disabled officers' wages for over seven years. During that 
time, it never gave COBA any indication that there was a mistake or that it intended to 
cease the practice. 
The County's argument that its discretion was unfettered because of the IRS 
opinion letter is misplaced. The IRS opinion letter was not mandatory and provided the 
County with an alternative which it followed for over seven years. Consequently, the 
County's duty to bargain prior to the change in practice was not pre-empted by the IRS 
opinion letter or by any statutory construction. The County had the discretion to choose 
1585 NY2d 480, 28 PERB lf7005 (1995). 
164PERB U3060(1971). 
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whether to withhold income tax from controverted claims. We have held that the 
exercise of discretion is generally subject to a duty to bargain.17 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Immediately revert to the method of handling income tax 
withholding which existed prior to February 11,1999, for correction 
officers whose Workers' Compensation and GML §207-c claims are 
being controverted; 
2. Immediately make all employees whole for any wages and benefits lost as a 
result of the change in method of handling income tax withholding from the 
date of that change until reversion to the prior method, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate; 
^Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 18 PERB 1J4621 
(1984), aff'd, 19 PERB 1J3015 (1985), confd sub nom. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. 
Dist of the City of New York v. PERB, 21 PERB TJ7001 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1988), 
rev'd, 147 AD2d 70, 22 PERB 1J7014 (3d Dep't 1989), rev'd, 75 NY2d 660, 23 PERB 
H7012(1990). 
Board - U-20707 
3. Sign and post the attached Notice at all locations ordinarily used to 
communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: May 1,2000 
Albany, New York 
-8 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Westchester (County) in the unit represented by the Westchester 
County Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. that the County will: 
1. Immediately revert to the method of handling income tax withholding which existed prior 
to February 11, 1999, for correction officers whose Workers' Compensation and GML 
§207-c claims are being controverted; 
2. Immediately make all employees whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of the 
change in method of handling income tax withholding from the date of that change until 
reversion to the prior method, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
f") PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of '• 
JOHN THOMAS MCANDREW, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-21054 
PORT JERVIS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN THOMAS MCANDREW, pro se 
CUDDEBACK & ONOFRY (ROBERT A. ONOFRY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by John Thomas McAndrew to a 
decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) dismissing his improper practice charge alleging that the Port Jervis 
City School District (District) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the Superintendent of Schools refused to meet with him to 
discuss his concerns about the Superintendent's conduct of an election to choose a 
delegate and an alternate to the annual meeting of the New York State Teachers' 
Retirement System (Retirement System). 
A hearing was held before the Assistant Director with McAndrew appearing pro 
se and the District represented by counsel. At the close of McAndrew's narrative 
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testimony, the District moved to dismiss McAndrew's charge for failure of proof. The 
Assistant Director closed the record and advised the parties that they would be afforded 
the opportunity to file briefs on the motion once the transcript for the hearing was 
received. The Assistant Director thereafter notified the parties that he had received the 
transcript and that briefs could be filed on the motion. Only McAndrew responded. 
The Assistant Director dismissed McAndrew's charge, finding that the election 
for a delegate to the Retirement System did not arise from or relate to the employer-
employee relationship between the Superintendent and McAndrew. As a result, the 
Assistant Director held that McAndrew had not established the violations alleged. 
McAndrew excepts to the Assistant Director's decision, arguing that an 
employer-employee relationship exists with respect to the delegate election and that the. 
Superintendent discriminated against him, in violation of District policy and practice, by : 
refusing to meet with him when he had met with another unit member involved in the 
same election. The District has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered McAndrew's arguments, we affirm 
the decision of the Assistant Director. 
FACTS 
Section 505 of the New York State Education Law provides that the 
Superintendent of Schools is the chief administrative officer of a territorial unit 
responsible for conducting elections for delegates and alternates to the Retirement 
System annual convention. McAndrew was a candidate in the 1999 election. He 
requested a meeting with the Superintendent to discuss his concerns about the conduct 
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of the election. McAndrew testified that the Superintendent refused to meet with 
McAndrew, stating that "I'm not interested in discussing this. I am in charge. I run the 
election." McAndrew further testified that it was his belief that the Superintendent had 
met with the other candidate in the election and that the Superintendent refused to 
meet with him because McAndrew had filed several previous improper practice 
charges, three of which resulted in the District being found by PERB to have violated 
the Act.1 It was McAndrew's testimony that the Superintendent had animus against him 
because he prevailed in these charges. • 
DISCUSSION 
In City of Salamanca,2 we outlined the respective burdens in cases involving 
allegedly improperly motivated actions: 
In order to establish such improper motivation, a charging 
party must prove that he had been engaged in protected 
activities, and that the respondent had knowledge of and 
acted because of those activities. [Footnote omitted] If the 
charging party proves a prima facie case of improper 
motivation, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent 
to establish that its actions were motivated by legitimate 
business reasons. [Footnote omitted] 
1
 See Port Jervis City Sch. Dist., 32 PERB 1J4545 (1999); Port Jervis Teachers 
Ass'n and Port Jervis City Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J4673 (1995); Port Jervis City Sch. 
Dist, 24 PERB 1J3031 (1991). See also Port Jervis Teachers Ass'n, 22 PERB 1J3021, 
cont'd, 22 PERB 1J7021 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1989); Port Jervis City Sch. Dist, 22 
PERB P022 (1989); Port Jervis Teachers Ass'n, 19 PERB 1J3038 (1986); Port Jervis 
Teachers Ass'n, 18 PERB 1J3044 (1988); Port Jervis City Sch. Dist, 18 PERB 1J4561 
(1988); Port Jervis City Sch. Dist, 18 PERB 1J4560 (1988), where McAndrew's improper 
practice charges against the District and/or the Association were dismissed. 
J-
218 PERB 1J3012, at 3027 (1985). 
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McAndrew meets the first two prongs of the test because he has a history of 
filing improper practice charges against both the District and his bargaining agent and 
the Superintendent is aware of McAndrew's protected activities. However, the record is 
devoid of any evidence of improper motivation on the part of the Superintendent with 
respect to his alleged refusal to meet with McAndrew to discuss the Retirement System 
election. McAndrew points to prior improper practice charges which he filed against the 
District and in which he prevailed as evidence ofthe Superintendent's animus. Although 
the parties' labor relations history, including evidence of an employer's animus, is 
properly considered as a factor in determining whether an action was improperly 
motivated, such evidence is merely one factor among several that must be considered. 
Proof of a contentious labor history is not conclusive evidence that all acts taken within 
the context of that relationship are always, or even necessarily, improperly motivated.3 
There is no other record evidence of any animus on the part ofthe District, only 
McAndrew's testimony that he believes that the District is improperly motivated against 
him because he files improper practice charges and grievances against it. McAndrew's 
subjective belief is insufficient proof of animus to support a finding of a violation of 
§§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act.4 
Further, as found by the Assistant Director, the Superintendent was not acting in 
his capacity as the chief executive officer of the District when he refused to meet with 
3See Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB1J3079 (1995); Erie County Water Auth., 27 
PERB P010(1995). 
4See State of New York - Unified Ct. Sys., 27 PERB 1J3012 (1994) 
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McAndrew but as the chief administrative officer of the territorial district as designated 
by §505 of the Education Law. Any improprieties which may be involved in the election 
or the Superintendent's action in relation to the election are appropriately addressed in 
a different forum.5 As the Superintendent's refusal did not arise from or affect the 
employer-employee relationship, the Superintendent's action does not violate the Act.6 
Based on the foregoing, McAndrew's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the Assistant Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: May 1, 2000 
Albany, New York 
5McAndrew has filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Education. 
6See Bd. ofEduc. of the CiiySch. Dist. of the City of New York, 15 PERB ^3136 
(1982). See also Town of Newark Valley and Lawrence Kasmarcik, Highway 
Superintendent, 16 PERB 1J4621, afTd on other grounds, 16 PERB 1J3102 (1983), 
petition to set aside dismissed, 17 PERB fl7005 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1984); 
Town of Santa Clara, 15 PERB 1J4630 (1982), affd on other grounds, 16 PERB 1J3014 
(1983). 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ / M a r c A. Abrjott, Mernber 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
") PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
' Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4918 
CITY OF AMSTERDAM, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-4918 page 2 
Included: Chief Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator, Chief Water 
Treatment Plant Operator, City Engineer, Director of Community 
and Economic Development, and Transportation Supervisor. 
Excluded: Recreation Director and all other employees. 
RJRTHER7IT IS ORDERED thatrtherabovemarried publicnempToyer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2000 
Albany, New York 
MichaelJ#r/Cuevas, Chairman 
' Mare A. Abbott, Member 
J/ohri T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4944 
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL ELMONT, FLORAL PARK, 
FRANKLIN SQUARE AND NEW HYDE PARK CENTRAL 
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 
Employer, 
-and-
SEWANHAKA EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL NEA/NY, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
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public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All Building and Grounds classified custodial personnel (non-
supervisory custodial personnel7full=timerand steady part=time). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2000 
Albany, New York 
I R. Cuevas, Chairman 
• ) tAMt-
/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
I 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
~' Petitioner, ; ~ 
-and- CASE NO. C-4967 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF OCEAN BEACH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time (i.e., more than 20 hours per week of regularly 
scheduled work on a year-round basis) employees in the following 
civil service titles: Administrative Assistant, Labor Crew Leader, 
Maintenance Mechanic II, Laborer, Water Meter Reader, Archivist, 
Second Deputy Clerk, Carpenter. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2000 
Albany, New York 
-^lAi^tyCi^J^J^-
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ ' Marc A. Abbott, Member 
• 4 . 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
_y 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL #264, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4979 
VILLAGE OF ALLEGANY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local #264, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time Department of Public Works 
employees. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local #264, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonablertimes"and conferin good faithrwith respect to wagesrhours^and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2000 
Albany, New York 
Michae>R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Ivfarc A. AbbottTMember 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
